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The price of market access: patents in AUSFTA and since 
Introduction 
AUSFTA is a new generation comprehensive trade agreement that goes well beyond tariffs and 
tariff barriers. The new agenda items were mostly proposed by the USA, which had already 
negotiated several such agreements. For Australia it was newer territory. Some of the non-trade 
items – such as greatly extended copyright terms and linking patents with data protection – were 
highly controversial. There was less public discussion of the patent provisions.  
Patent monopolies sit uneasily in a free trade context as patents, by their nature, are anti-
competitive. Yet, in a remarkable feat of negotiation, intellectual property policies were tied to 
free trade treaties as a result of the new single undertaking in the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement 
(which established the WTO). The WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) was largely proposed by a small number of global companies whose 
profits were highly dependent on copyright and patent policy (Drahos 2002; Sell 2003). These 
interest groups failed to achieve their full agenda in TRIPS. Shortly after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, the US began negotiating a series of preferential trade agreements, all including 
substantially greater provisions on patents (Drahos 2001; Sell 2011). These agreements cover 
only a small proportion of US trade, and are mostly with small or low income countries.1 The 
most significant of these is AUSFTA. Although Australia counts for only one percent of US 
trade, its status as a long-established high-income country was important for legitimizing the US 
patent agenda.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the AUSFTA patent and data protection provisions against 
the background of the kind of patent policy that would most benefit Australians and Australian 
inventors. 
TRIPS mandates that the needs of both creators and users of technology be balanced in a manner 
that benefits society as a whole (Article 7). However the proponents of the TRIPS+ patent agenda 
represent only the interests of patent holders. The language in which their pro-patent proposals is 
couched conflates the new proposed standards with increased innovation, invention and 
economic prosperity (Neuwelt et al. 2015). Evidence for such a relationship is at best varied and 
contingent. Yet the official Australian website claims unambiguous benefits from “a strong 
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intellectual property regime”.2 
Australia was a “friend of intellectual property” in the Uruguay Round negotiations which led to 
TRIPS. The reasons are unclear. The rational position for a country with Australia’s negative 
balance on licensing fees and royalties3 would be to oppose any broadening of the patent system. 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has never justified the position Australia 
took and still appears not to understand that changes to the patent system impact on the economy 
as a whole (Productivity Commission 2010: 262-264). Given ample warnings about the potential 
negative impacts of intellectual property provisions from the nation’s expert body, it would seem 
that, on patent-related issues, DFAT suffers more from a case of ‘willful blindness’ than from 
‘failure to understand’.  
The paper proceeds with a brief discussion of the key elements of a balanced patent policy – one 
that aims to provide incentives for useful new technology that would not otherwise not occur, 
without impeding other inventors or creating higher than necessary costs. This is compared with 
the patent policy prescriptions which Australia promoted as a friend of TRIPS. In section 3 the 
patent and data protection provisions of AUSFTA are discussed and compared with balanced 
provisions and the TRIPS provisions. The AUSFTA patent policy changes are then traced 
through subsequent Australian trade agreements (Section 4). The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of unbalanced patent policy and a consideration of whether the 
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations will see yet further imbalance. 
Balanced patent policy and the TRIPS Agreement 
The patent system is complex, rife with specialized language, and many ordinary words take 
highly specialised meanings. These factors operate to exclude many analysts from attempting to 
understand the patent system. But its essence is very simple. It is a bargain between society and 
inventors to provide 20-year monopolies in exchange for beneficial new knowledge. The 
underlying assumption is that the benefits from the new knowledge (dynamic efficiency gains) 
will exceed the losses from reduced competition (static efficiency losses).  
Because the patent incentive operates by stopping other inventors from exploiting their 
independent inventions, it needs to be designed carefully.4 An efficient patent system would grant 
patents only to those inventions which would not have occurred without the patent incentive and 
which provide sufficient social benefit to offset the losses from granting the monopoly. Both 
qualifiers are important and warrant further explanation.  
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Would not otherwise occur: It is self-evident that if someone would create and commercialise 
an invention without a patent, then no patent should be granted, because of the negative impact of 
the patent monopoly on other inventors. There is substantial evidence that most industrial 
inventions would be developed and commercialised without patents (López 2009). Despite this, 
US courts have led a move to grant patents for previously unpatentable things – particularly 
software and genetic discoveries. Although the US Supreme Court is now indicating that this has 
gone too far and should be wound back, US trade negotiators continue to run with an 
expansionary agenda.5 
Patents are most likely to be needed where research and development costs are high and the 
resulting product is simpler and easier to copy. In such situations competitors can quickly enter 
the market, pricing below the original product as research does not have to be undertaken. The 
prime example is pharmaceuticals and other fine chemicals. It is not surprising then to find that it 
is the pharmaceutical industry which is driving the patent and data protection provisions in 
preferential trade agreements.  
Provide net benefits to society: But even for pharmaceuticals, granting a monopoly only makes 
sense if the benefits exceed the costs. Clearly this is the case for entirely new drugs which deliver 
a substantial health benefit. It is less clear for 'me-too' drugs, though there can be improvements 
in health outcomes with the development of alternative versions of genuinely new drugs. It is 
questionable, however, whether there is any societal benefit in granting a patent to an umpteenth 
version of a low-dose combination oral contraceptive, such as Bayer's patent for a contraceptive 
sold in Australia as Yaz.6 Yet in April 2013 the Federal Court of Australia upheld such a patent.7 
And it is certain that the social cost of the many minor patents surrounding a blockbuster drug – 
delaying generic competition – more than exceeds any benefits. Such evergreening patents take 
the form of new doses, formulations, combinations, or uses and are a key component of 
pharmaceutical lifecycle management, substantially increasing profits at the cost of consumers 
and taxpayers (Moir and Palombi 2013). The limitations and costs of Australia’s current patent 
policy approach are discussed in greater detail below. Suffice to note here the importance of 
achieving a balanced patent policy. While there are many other aspects to such a policy (Moir 
2014), the three most important elements are: 
• limiting patents to inventions which would not otherwise occur 
(proxied by a technology limit, which partly aligns with high development costs); 
• ensuring that real inventiveness is required 
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(as this is a proxy for the societal benefit of new knowledge); and 
• limiting privileges to sale in the market where the patent holds 
(to minimize unnecessary damage to competition). 
As we will see, the TRIPS agreement, while not perfect, left countries significant scope to pusrue 
a balanced patent policy approach.  
The TRIPS Agreement 
TRIPS was one of the most contentious aspects of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations. Partly 
as a result of this, the treaty has a certain degree of balance, incorporating safeguards such as an 
objectives statement. Article 7 reads as though it was written particularly for patent policy: 
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” (TRIPS Article 7). 
Most patent systems fail this standard. Their inventiveness standard is so low that many granted 
patents deliver only costs not benefits (Moir 2013b). By ignoring the technology limitation, they 
grant patents that would have occurred anyway. A plethora of complex rules tilt the whole system 
in favour of patent grant (FTC 2003: 8).  
One policy element that is fundamental to ensuring balance in a patent system is limitation to 
technology. This premise is so basic that it has rarely been written down. Its absence has allowed 
courts, both in the USA and in Australia, to broaden the scope of patent policy in ways that were 
never envisioned by lawmakers and have never been subjected to any evidence-based analysis. 
Key business participants in the advisory structures of the Office of the US Trade Representative 
gain considerable profits from the extension of patents to non-technology areas such as software, 
and TRIPS+ patent proposals often embody such extensions.  
This is in contrast to the clear language in TRIPS that allows countries to limit patent policy to 
technological inventions.8 Indeed TRIPS clearly specifies that software developments should be 
granted copyright protection (Article 10). TRIPS allows countries the sovereign right to limit 
patents to technological inventions. It also allows other exclusions from patentability – diagnostic 
and other methods for the treatment of humans or animals; and plants and animals.9  
By strongly enforcing the limitation of patents to technological inventions, a patent system can 
approximate a limitation to inventions with high development costs – those which would not 
occur in the absence of patents. This increases the efficiency and effectiveness of a patent system 
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and acts to reduce unbalanced outcomes.  
TRIPS also allows full flexibility in implementing the compulsory patentability criteria of 
novelty, inventiveness and utility. Where there is not a direct benefit, such as improved health 
outcomes, it is the new knowledge or know-how embodied in a patented invention which is the 
principle benefit society gains to offset the monopoly costs. A high inventiveness standard acts to 
limit unnecessary monopolies, which incur costs but provide no benefits.  
A high inventiveness standard does nothing to disadvantage businesses who are at the forefront 
of new technology developments. Genuine inventions would have patent protection but rent-
seeking would be substantially reduced. A high standard would radically reduce the volume of 
patents granted for trivial ‘inventions’, including evergreening pharmaceutical patents, This 
would substantially improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the patent system. As over 90 per 
cent of Australian patents are granted to foreign entities, such a change would have an 
unambiguously positive outcome both for Australia and for Australian inventors.10  
There is one major area where TRIPS presents an impediment to achieving balance in a patent 
system. TRIPS mandates a very broad range of privileges for patent holders. WTO compliant 
patents allow the holder to prevent third parties from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing for these purposes” the patented item. Such sweeping privileges widen the anti-
competitive effects of patent systems and go well beyond the incentives needed to induce 
inventions which would not otherwise occur.  
In respect of compulsory protections for clinical trial data, TRIPS allows WTO members 
substantial flexibility. Article 39 allows for protection for undisclosed (clinical trial) information 
used to gain marketing approval for pharmaceuticals. This article is broadly worded, allowing 
countries room to determine what arrangements best suit their economy and society. The key 
term “unfair commercial use” is capable of widely differing interpretations. 
AUSFTA provisions on patents and data exclusivity: enshrining imbalance 
Australia did not enter into any post-WTO preferential trade agreements until the early 2000s. It 
then negotiated three agreements almost simultaneously. These were the Thailand Free Trade 
Agreement (TAFTA), the Singapore Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and AUSFTA. The 
TAFTA agreement differs substantially from SAFTA and AUSFTA in respect of intellectual 
property (IP) provisions. The TAFTA IP text is just two pages, imposing no new obligations on 
either party.  
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This contrasts strongly with the IP provisions in both SAFTA and AUSFTA, which are long and 
contain considerable prescriptive detail. The USA’s FTA with Singapore entered into force on 1 
January 2004, and it seems probable that the very different IP chapter in SAFTA was directly 
influenced by what Singapore had already agreed with the USA. As will be seen below, most 
recent preferential Australian trade agreements also follow the new detailed and prescriptive US 
pattern. This new Australian pattern has clearly been strongly influenced by US policy. 
Weatherall (2015, this volume) has pointed out that AUSFTA marks a break in the Australian 
approach to negotiating copyright. It also marks a radical change in Australia's approach to 
patents in trade treaties.  
While the provenance of these new provisions was American, Australia had no active patent 
policy position to fall back on in responding to them. Domestically there has never been an 
economic review of the patent system.11 Even with the major changes consequent on TRIPS, no 
review was undertaken, and the government has thus fallen back on the simple position that if a 
proposal does not require any legislative amendment, then it is unproblematic. This ignores the 
substantial evidence available that the current design of the patent system, both in Australia and 
in the USA, is in urgent need of reform. The current design does not serve the needs of either 
Australian inventors or Australian consumers (Moir 2013a).  
Against this background, ready acquiescence to eliminate all future reform possibilities is 
concerning. The recent Competition Policy Review has recommended an overarching review of 
intellectual property, including principles underlying the inclusion of IP in trade agreements and 
how any such negotiating mandates should be established (Harper et al. 2015: 41). Highly 
prescriptive regulations in international treaties severely limit the scope for such much-needed 
domestic reform.  
AUSFTA deals with patent issues in a single article (Article 17.9), with 15 sub-sections and 
multiple sub-sub-sections (Table 1). It starts with the very unbalanced requirement that patentable 
inventions must now include “any new uses or methods of using a known product”. The TRIPS 
exclusion of plants and animals is dropped. Both provisions re-appear in the TPP negotiations. 
Neither required any policy change in Australia, but both are symptomatic of an unbalanced 
system.  
Where a product has been previously patented it has been provided with the right of preventing 
all commercial uses of that product for up to 20 years.12 This includes preventing all methods of 
commercial use. So a new patent for a specific use of a known thing is double-dipping. It 
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supports evergreening – pharmaceutical patents for ‘inventions’ such as new forms, dosages and 
methods of use of known compounds. They have very low levels of inventiveness but can 
substantially delay generic competition (Moir and Palombi 2013).  Such patents are unlikely to 
provide any health improvements. But they do radically increase the cost to Australian taxpayers 
and consumers through the delayed entry of generic pharmaceuticals. Writing these domestic 
regulatory details into an international treaty ties the hands of future governments with respect to 
options for patent reform. 
As noted above TRIPS provides extensive privileges to a patent holder. AUSFTA further extends 
these (Table 1). AUSFTA prevents parallel importation, specifically limits the use of patent 
information before patent expiry to a single ground and provides patent term extensions to offset 
delays in both patent processing and marketing approval. None of these limitations are in TRIPS. 
While TRIPS provisions on compulsory licenses (CLs) are extensive, they are not highly 
prescriptive. The AUSFTA provisions substantially narrow the range of circumstances when  
CLs can be used. The AUSFTA text removes anti-competitive conduct as a ground for revoking a 
patent. This text has no effect, as a side letter allows revocation due to anti-competitive conduct 
as long as this follows a judicial proceeding. This approach of writing details into treaty text, but 
then negating them though separate documents allows the text to be used to demonstrate 
commitments which have not actually been made. In agreeing to this deceitful strategy, Australia 
provides support to the US to broaden agreement to a limitation which it will not itself agree.  
AUSFTA covers many other patent matters on which TRIPS is silent. These are both procedural 
(grace periods and amendments), and substantive (full disclosure and fair basis).13 AUSFTA 
mandates the US definition of 'utility' – this “specific, substantial and credible” approach is 
contentious (Thambisetty 2009). Finally, AUSFTA contains commitments to reduce differences 
in law and practice, participate in international patent harmonisation efforts and establish a 
framework to progress towards mutual exploitation of search and examination work.  
Prior to AUSFTA, Australia already had a very unbalanced patent system, strongly favouring the 
interests of patent-holders over consumers and other users of technology. The breadth of the 
patent system had been widened through judicial action; the very low inventiveness standard fell 
further, again due to judicial action (Lawson 2007); and granted privileges were extensive, 
particularly for pharmaceuticals. In other words the Australian patent system was very like that in 
the USA. By writing bad policy into an international treaty, AUSFTA substantially increases 
impediments to much-needed reform in both Australia and the USA.14 
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Patent law harmonisation is superficially appealing. But in practice it simply seeks to extend anti-
competitive laws globally without any evaluation of their impact on innovators (Kingston 2004). 
The provisions are highly detailed and prescriptive, amounting to heavy-handed over-regulation, 
limiting innovation, improvement and responses to future changes. As Weatherall (2014) has 
shown for the copyright provisions, such over-prescription can have negative impacts. The texts 
contain nothing about agreed outcomes, as is now the norm in efficient and pro-innovation 
regulation.  
Data protection is another area in which the AUSFTA entrenches an imbalanced patent system. 
TRIPS provides protection for clinical trial data.15 Article 39 allows substantial room for 
countries to determine what arrangements best suit their economy and society. In particular 
countries are free to define what constitutes “unfair commercial use.” 
In contrast AUSFTA mandates a strict 5-year protection from competition for “undisclosed test 
or other data concerning safety or efficacy” used as a basis of marketing approval. This broadens 
the range of data protected and eliminates the option of exceptions and flexibilities. The 
AUSFTA wording – a new product that does not contain a chemical entity previously approved 
for marketing – allows more products to claim the 5 years of marketing data protection than was 
possible under TRIPS. The relevant US industry advisory body (IFAC-3) notes this wording 
change as a victory.16 
AUSFTA not only strengthens data protection for new pharmaceuticals. It also mandates three 
years of market protection where a regulatory authority requires additional data for approving a 
product other than a new product. This effectively extends data protection to variations to already 
launched drugs. AUSFTA specifically states that the data protections apply even where 
underlying patents have expired. 
The data that must be protected are data that demonstrate whether or not a product is safe and 
more efficacious than a placebo. As it would be unethical to require generic manufacturers to 
undertake duplicate clinical trials,17 limiting their use by other parties has the effect of potentially 
delaying generic entry to the market. In many ways this government benefit provides a more 
robust support to pharmaceutical profitability than do patents. Patents can be challenged in court, 
but data protection provisions cannot. 
The final provisions of Article 17.10 extend the impact of data protection by introducing “patent 
linkage” to Australia. First developed in the USA in 1984, patent linkage provisions have the 
effect of turning the drug safety authorities into an arm of patent enforcement and placing 
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obligations on generic entrants to notify patent owners of their planned entry to the market. 
Other Australian trade agreements: amplifying imbalance 
Since 2003 Australia has concluded preferential trade agreements with Singapore, Thailand, the 
USA, Chile, Malaysia, ASEAN and New Zealand, Korea and Japan. An agreement with China 
has been announced, but at the time of writing no details about content were available.  
All these preferential agreements are 'comprehensive' – they deal with matters well beyond trade 
and investment. All have IP provisions. These generally focus on copyright, especially in an 
electronic context; trademarks; enforcement of copyrights and trademarks; and general co-
operation. Only a few address patent and data protection policy. 
Some address relatively minor patent matters – such as grace periods and classification systems, 
while others address important issues of balance such as opposition and revocation procedures 
(see Table 1).  
Of more importance in achieving balance in patent policy are opposition and revocation 
provisions, requirements about what must be granted patents, and full disclosure.  Korea – which 
also has an FTA with the USA – repeats the AUSFTA requirement to grant patents for “any new 
uses or methods of using a known product”, thus extending the breadth of the patent system. As 
with AUSFTA, KAFTA limits the grounds for revocation of a patent, and specifies the details for 
full disclosure. Again the hand of the US is evident in these provisions. The Chile agreement 
simply allows for both revocation and opposition. Such procedures are critical elements of 
balance, allowing well-funded competitors to challenge patent whish should not have been 
granted.  
The Malaysia Australia Free Trade Agreement (MAFTA) includes a major TRIPS+ issue that 
goes beyond the AUSFTA provisions or anything yet demanded by the USA: the introduction of 
presumptive validity for patents. Presumptive validity creates a higher threshold of proof for 
anyone wanting to challenge the validity of a patent. This provision is despite the fact that the 
Australian patent statute specifically states that a patent granted in Australia cannot be 
presumed valid.18 As DFAT claims to work on the basis of current domestic policy in 
negotiating IP provisions this commitment is astonishing. In the USA the presumption of patent 
validity has been a major impediment to the challenge of patents with very little inventiveness 
(Jaffe and Lerner 2004). The fact that this presumption does not exist in Australia is one of the 
few remaining elements of balance in Australia's patent system. It may be that DFAT was not 
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made aware of this statutory provision. No steps have yet been taken to make the necessary 
legislative amendments, though MAFTA came into force in 2013.  
Implications, including for the TPP, and alternative ways forward 
One of the most important facts about free trade is that it is domestic reforms which deliver the 
most benefit; improved market access is a minor gain to very limited sections of the 
community.19 The reason is that domestic reforms increase competition and so reduce costs 
across the board, benefitting consumers and businesses alike. Tariff barriers act to increase 
prices. It has been repeatedly documented that the national cost of supporting an industry through 
tariff barriers is substantially greater than the national cost of supporting the same level of 
industrial activity through direct subsidies.20  
Recent analyses of the impact of pharmaceutical product patents show that patents operate very 
like tariff barriers. They protect producer monopolies with consequent high prices. There are 
three recent economic studies with show that, as with tariffs, it would be far cheaper to directly 
subsidise pharmaceutical research than to grant them patents.  
Branstetter and colleagues (2011) estimate the consumer surplus generated in the USA by 
policies which facilitate early generic entry to the pharmaceutical market.21 They estimate 
consumer gains at around UA$92 billion, and producers losses at some US$14 billion. Clearly 
the price paid by consumers is far greater than the benefit received by producers. The USA would 
benefit considerably if it reformed its patent system to minimise evergreening and ensure early 
generic competition. If the pharmaceutical industry needed support, a direct subsidy would be 
cheaper and more efficient. 
The evidence base for this finding extends beyond the US experience. Chaudhuri and colleagues 
(2010) and Dutta (2011) both investigate the impact of introducing chemical product patents in 
India. Chaudhuri and colleagues use data on quinolones (broad spectrum antibacterial drugs) also 
finding that consumer effects substantially exceed producer effects. The welfare loss from 
product patents just for quinolones is US$144 to 450 million annually while gains to the 
subsidiaries of foreign firms are just US$20 to 53 million. With net losses of US$124 - 397 
million annually, pharmaceutical product patents are clearly an expensive proposition. Dutta uses 
data for a cross-section of drugs in the Indian pharmaceutical market and finds an average price 
increase of 42 percent. This generates a consumer welfare loss of US$378m (an average loss of 
US$9 million per drug). In contrast the benefit to patent rights holders is just $1.4 million per 
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drug (Dutta 2011: 177). 
While these three studies focus on only one aspect of patent policy they demonstrate clearly that 
the social cost of patent policy is both absolutely high and substantially higher than the cost of 
alternative more efficient policies. The gains to producers are between an eighth and a sixth of 
the cost to consumers. As with tariff barriers, it would be far more efficient to directly subsidise 
pharmaceutical production than to grant product patents. It is deeply ironic, therefore, that such 
patent monopolies are required as part of the WTO’s 'free trade' suite of agreements. 
It was powerful lobby groups who played the key role in establishing global norms on patents 
(Drahos 2002; Kingston 2004; Sell 2003). They are direct beneficiaries of the system they were 
instrumental in establishing. They also play a key role in further tilting patent policy through 
post-2000 preferential trade agreements (Drahos 2001; Sell 2011). 
Of 27 TRIPS+ changes to patent policy agreed by Australia in preferential trade agreements, 21 
were first introduced in the AUSFTA (Table 1). Two of these might be of benefit to users of new 
technologies, depending on how they are implemented. These are changes to the disclosure 
requirements and the requirement for pre- or post grant opposition processes. Depending on how 
the public education provisions operate, they may solely benefit rights-holders or they may also 
address user concerns. The other 24 changes all operate in the interests of patent owners.  
Two of the TRIPS+ provisions extend the reach of the patent system, requiring patentability for 
things that did not have to be patented under TRIPS.  
Others provide for even more extended patent owner privileges. AUSFTA provisions reduce 
competition during the patent term (by eliminating the right of parallel importation), restrict use 
of patent information before expiry, further limit use of compulsory licenses (in itself a rare 
event), extend patent terms (in specific circumstances) and create far stronger data exclusivity 
provisions. Together these add to a significant delay in the entry of competitors into the market. 
Estimating the welfare impact of delayed competition requires access to substantial data, not 
generally available. We do however have some indirect evidence on the issue – the behaviour of 
innovating Australian firms with respect to patents. In 2004-05 the Australian National 
Innovation Survey showed that 34 per cent of Australian firms were innovating (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2007: 12). About 2,100 firms were introducing "new to the world" 
innovations, and about 2,800 firms "new to the Australia" innovations. It is these firms that might 
be expected to own patents. If all reported patent use is among such innovators, then about one in 
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five such firms use the patent system. Patent use is more frequent in large than in smaller 
innovating firms. The Australian patent system is also extensively used by overseas entities – 
consistently, year after year, about 92 per cent of granted Australian patents are owned by 
overseas entities. 
A final set of TRIPS+ provisions encourage co-ordination and harmonisation of patent systems, 
including administrative sub-systems such as search and examination. But the system that is 
being harmonised is unbalanced and inefficient. In a major review of the US patent system in 
2003, the US Federal Trade Commission (2003) concluded that it needed major reform. This 
view is supported by substantial evidence-based economic analysis, focusing particularly on 
problems arising from the low inventiveness requirement and the extension of patents to fields 
that were previously unpatentable (notably software and generic discoveries).   
By bringing current low patentability standards into the AUSFTA and agreeing to a wide range of 
increases in the privileges granted to patent holders the Howard Government limited the capacity 
of all future governments to reform the patent system. The data exclusivity and patent linkage 
provisions created new policy, solely of benefit to patent-holders, and with direct implications for 
the cost of pharmaceuticals to Australians, including taxpayers.22 
Few of the TRIPS+ provisions in the AUSFTA are reflected in Australia's other preferential trade 
agreements (Table 1). The most frequent patent-related matters in Australia's other agreements 
are 'education' and co-operation (especially with respect to search and examination). There is also 
a trend towards establishing oversight committees. 
The AUSFTA text was largely written by the USA. The leaked IP text of the proposed TPP23 
reflects US authorship too, with the hand of the pharmaceutical industry clearly evident. Many of 
the provisions in the AUSFTA are evident in the draft TPP (see Table 2). The TPP thus attempts 
to broaden the number of nations agreeing to TRIPS+ provisions, but with a more demanding 
agenda than AUSFTA. This ratcheting down of patent standards to even lower levels of 
inventiveness is clear in the US and Japanese proposal that patents may not be denied solely 
because they do not "result in enhanced efficacy of the known product" (Article E.1(a)). This 
wording is clearly designed to remove limits to pharmaceutical patents such as that used in 
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act.24 This wording clearly indicates that – all protestations to 
the contrary – the standard for patent grant is far too low.  
The TPP also seeks to extend the monopoly privileges granted to patent owners, with all but two 
of the extensions in the AUSFTA re-appearing in the TPP (Table 2).25 Some of the moves towards 
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greater harmonisation that were evident in the AUSFTA also re-appear in the TPP. But of the six 
items that appear in Australia's other agreements (items 22 to 27 in Table 1) only two appear in 
the TPP. Again this provides evidence of the key role played by the USA in drafting the 
provisions in all such treaties.  
The patent system operates by making the dissemination of new technology more expensive, 
including by preventing independent invention. It is therefore critical that patent policy be as 
parsimonious as possible – that patents are only granted where needed and where there is a net 
benefit. This is far from the case in any patent system in the world. There are many interests lined 
up against reforming the patent system to focus on the job it is meant to do – encourage 
inventions with positive spillovers that would not otherwise occur. Harmonisation simply makes 
the already hard job of patent reform even harder. It ties the hands of future governments limiting 
their room for effective reform of domestic law. The simplistic view of many of IP negotiators 
that there is no harm in agreeing to provisions which simply mirror current practice is based on 
the entirely false premise that the current system is worth preserving forever. In Australia, an 
immediate pause on harmonisation efforts to allow a thorough review of the current system is the 
first step towards nationally beneficial reform. While TRIPS mandates a patent system, it also 
requires that it be balanced. A patent review might take as its starting point the breadth of the 
system and the inventiveness requirement – both substantially increase the costs of a patent 
system without providing any discernable benefit to Australian inventors and innovators.  
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Table 1  Key TRIPS+ provisions on patents# 
  Provision AUSFTA 
Article 17. 
Other 
1 “any new uses or methods of using a known product” to be 
patentable 
9.1 KAFTA 
2 “plants and animals other than micro-organisms” not 
mentioned as excludable from patentability 
9.2 KAFTA 
3 Parallel importation not allowed (national exhaustion) 9.4   
4 Bases for revoking or cancelling patents narrowed 9.5 Chile; KAFTA 
5 Limitation on use of patent data before expiry to 
marketing approval applications 
9.6   
6 Limiting grant of compulsory licenses 9.7   
7 Term extensions for regulatory delays 9.8b   
8 Term extensions for examination delays 9.8a   
9 Strict 5 year new product data exclusivity 10.1   
10 Extension of data exclusivity from undisclosed to other 
data 
10.1   
11 Additional 3 years data exclusivity for any product where 
marketing authority requires new data 
10.2   
12 Drug approval authority to play role vis-à-vis patents 10.4   
13 Onus on generic manufacturers to advise brand companies 
when entering market 
10.4   
14 12 month grace period 9.9 Chile; KAFTA 
15 Amendments: at least once  9.10 JAEPA* 
16 Full disclosure “without undue experimentation” 
requirement 
9.11 KAFTA 
17 Fair basis: disclosure “reasonably conveys” 9.12 KAFTA 
18 Use US “specific, substantial and credible” utility criteria 9.13   
19 Reduce differences in law and practice 9.14   
20 Participate in international harmonisation 9.14   
21 Framework for mutual use of search and examination 
results 
9.15 Malaysia; JAEPA 
22 Pre-and/or post-grant opposition  Chile 
23 Use patent classification system  Chile 
24 Granted patents to be “presumptively valid”  Malaysia 
25 Co-operate on / streamline administration  Thai; AANZFTA; 
JAEPA 
26 Co-operate on “IP” education  SAFTA; Thai; 
AANZFTA; JAEPA 
27 Oversight committee  AANZFTA; KAFTA; 
JAEPA 
Notes: # Most of these agreements refer to TRIPS and up to 14 other international “IP” treaties 
 *  and provide reasons for refusal. 
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Table 2 AUSFTA patent provisions also appearing in the 2014 draft TPPA 
Substantive provisions US TPPA ask# Opposed by: 
Provisions affecting what can be patented: 
 “any new uses or methods of using a known 
product” to be patentable 
  
E.1.4 (AU,JP) 
  
CL/MY/PE/SG/VN/ 
BN/NZ/CA/MX 
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms” 
not mentioned as excludable from patentability 
  If "other than microorganisms" added fewer 
countries oppose 
E.1.3 
(JP, SG) 
AU/NZ/VN/BN/CL/ 
PE/MY/SG/CA/MX 
Provisions affecting patent privileges: 
Removal of anti-competitive conduct as a 
ground for revoking or cancelling patents 
E.3 
(JP) 
CA/CL/MX/BN/MY/AU/
VN/NZ/SG 
Limitation on use of patent data before expiry to 
marketing approval applications 
E.13 Unclear and contentious 
Term extensions for regulatory delays Annex (E.14) ## Unclear and contentious 
Term extensions for examination delays E.12 
(SG) 
CA/NZMY/VN/CL/ 
PE/MX/AU/BN 
Strict 5 year new product data exclusivity Annex (E.16) ## 
 
Unclear and contentious 
Additional 3 years data exclusivity for any 
product where marketing authority requires new 
data 
“undisclosed test or other data”  
Drug approval role vis-à-vis patents (patent 
linkage) 
Annex (E.17) ## Unclear and contentious 
Notification to originator companies before 
generic entry 
Annex, E.17 Unclear and contentious 
Full disclosure “without undue experimentation” 
requirement 
E.8 
(AU/PE/VN/JP) 
CL/MY/BN/NZ/CA/ 
SG/MX 
Fair basis if disclosure “reasonably conveys” E.9 (PE/AU/JP/ 
SG/VN) 
CL//MY/BN/NZ/CA/MX 
Use US “specific, substantial and credible” 
utility criteria 
E.10 
(AU/MX/SG) 
CL/MY/VN/PE/ 
BN/NZ/CA 
Administrative harmonisation:   
12 month grace period E.2 
 
Amendments: at least one opportunity E.7  
 
Reduce differences in law and practice B.3 
Participate in international harmonisation B.2 
Sharing of search and examination results B.3 
Issues not in AUSFTA but in other Australian "FTAs" 
Granted patents presumed valid H.2.3 
Co-operate on “IP” education B.3. 
Notes: Based mainly on Section E. There are also general provisions which affect patents.  
# Countries in parentheses support the US position. 
##  Annex items are generally more contentious.  
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1
 The agreements cover only 8.5 percent of US trade, mostly accounted for by the three high-income countries 
Australia, Korea and Singapore (Flynn et al. 2012: 109-110). Other agreements are Jordan 2000; Bahrain 2004; 
Chile 2004; Morocco 2004; Colombia 2006; Oman 2006; Panama 2007; and Peru 2007.  
2
 See http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/australia-united-states-free-trade-agreement-fact-
sheets/Pages/intellectual-property.aspx, accessed 14 April 2015. 
3
 Australia has always run a negative balance on its trade in intellectual property (see, e.g. IPAC 1984). IP receipts 
over the past decade have been of the order of 0.25% to 0.5% of the current account and payments have been two to 
eight times larger at 1.0% to 1.5% (IP Australia 2013: 22). 
4
 For a more detailed analysis see Moir 2014. 
5
 Australian courts have followed this trend – for example adopting the much criticised State Street Bank decision to 
allow business method patenting (Welcome Real Time v Catuity [2001] FCA 445 (17 May 2001)). The High Court 
has not yet moved to prevent this. 
6
 At the time Yaz was marketed MedlinePlus (a US National Library of Medicine service), 
(http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a601050.html#brand-name-2 listed brand names  for 83 
different low-dose combination oral contraceptives. 
7
 Bayer Pharma v Generic Health [2013] FCA 279. 
8
 The TRIPS requirement that all technologies be treated equally (a core demand from the pharmaceutical industry) 
also impedes balanced patent policy. Technologies are very different – some are hard to copy, some easy. The 
empirical evidence shows that patents are only needed in limited technology areas (López 2009). Yet WTO members 
are forced to provide patents in technology areas where they are not needed.  
9
 Though microorganisms must be eligible for patents. If plants are not protected under patent law they must be 
granted a form of sui generis protection (TRIPS Article 27(3). Inventions that create morality or ordre public 
problems can also be refused patents. 
10
 There are widespread evidence-based criticisms of the very low inventiveness requirement in the US system (see, 
for example, Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Quillen Jr. 2006). The USA would, too, benefit unambiguously by lifting the 
inventiveness requirement to ensure at least some new knowledge was a requirement for patent grant. This would, 
however, prevent evergreening patents.  
11
 A 1984 review, which was meant to be economic, drew the dissenting comment from its sole economist that the 
report “does not live up to its claim to have adopted an economic perspective and to have applied economic criteria” 
(IPAC 1984: 79-80). The 2000 IPCRC review simply assumed that inventiveness was required before grant of a 
patent, a false assumption which calls its findings into grave doubt (IPCRC 2000). Since then there has been only 
one attempt at an independent inquiry (Harris et al. 2013), and that review systematically refused to look at the issue 
19 
                                                                                                                                                              
of inventiveness. The government has advised parliament that patents, because they provide a powerful exclusive 
right, are granted only for things that are "a significant advance over what is known or used" (Explanatory 
Memorandum to the 2011 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill). This statement is factually 
incorrect, as demonstrated both by the rules in the patent Examiner's manual and by the many trivial patents 
regularly granted (Moir 2013a). 
12
 25 years for pharmaceutical products. As it takes some time to get the patented product to market, the effective 
monopoly period is lower. The average effective period of market monopoly derived from a patent over a new 
breakthrough drug is 14 years in the USA (Harris et al. 2013: 83). 
13
 These other matters are also important to patent balance, but are not discussed here for reasons of space.  
14
 See, for example the discussion on manufacturing for export in the Pharmaceutical Patent Review (Harris et al. 
2013 
15
 Data protection provisions in TRIPS and the AUSFTA cover both clinical trial data for pharmaceuticals and safety 
data for agricultural chemicals. In both cases the term of protection for agricultural chemicals is ten years not five. 
Agricultural chemicals are outside the scope of this paper. 
16
 “IFAC-3 welcomes the regulatory-related definition of a “new product” contained in Article 17.10.1(d) as being a 
product that does not contain a chemical entity that had been previously approved in Australia as providing an 
important clarification of the term “new chemical entity” found in TRIPS Article 39.3.” (IFAC 2004: p,14, 
emphasis added).  
17
 Article 20 of the Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
prohibits the continuation of trials when conclusive results are known (18th World Medical Association General 
Assembly, Art. 20, http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.pdf). One can presume that it is also 
unethical to commence such trials when there are already conclusive results. 
18
 “Nothing done under this Act or the PCT guarantees the granting of a patent, or that a patent is valid, in Australia 
or anywhere else” (Patents Act 1990, S.20(1)). Despite this, in 2012, Yates, J stated that “[r]egistration of the patent 
is, of itself, prima facie evidence of validity” (Novartis v Hospira [2012] FCA 1055 per Yates J, paras 51, 91-94).  
19
 Despite this, DFAT focuses almost exclusively on “market access” issues, an emphasis salient on its trade 
webpage.  
20
 Indeed this was a primary reason that the UK's entry to the European Economic Community was so delayed. The 
UK's agricultural policy was based on subsidies, with substantial imports from Australia and New Zealand keeping 
consumer prices low. In the period before Australia reduced almost all tariff barriers, the Productivity Commission 
(then the Industries Assistance Commission) wrote many reports demonstrating that this basic economic fact holds 
across all industries. 
21
 See Holovac (2004) for a full discussion of how the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act operates to encourage generic 
producers to challenge weak patents and gain early entry to the market.  
20 
                                                                                                                                                              
22
 See the various submissions to the 2012-13 Pharmaceutical Patent Review (PPR), particularly that from 
Alphapharm, and also Moir and Palombi 2013. As IP Australia has dismantled the PPR website, copies of the 
submissions can be obtained from the author. The official papers are at http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/2013-05-
27_PPR_Final_Report.pdf.   
23
 The leaked 2014 version is used in this analysis (https://www.wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/#article_e4). The 2014 and 
2013 (https://wikileaks.org/tpp/) versions are very similar; as is the leaked 2011 version, which has been extensively 
analysed by Flynn et al. 2012. 
24
 This section takes wording from the European Medicines Agency’s procedures to make unpatentable inventions 
where there is no enhanced efficacy of a known product. The discussion in Novartis AG v Union of India and others, 
Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 of 2013, Supreme Court of India reviews the background to this part of the act 
(http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf).  
25
 The two that are missing from the 2014 draft are restrictions on the use of compulsory licenses and restrictions on 
parallel importing.  
